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Abstract. While international aid has signiicantly increased its support for the reconstruction of fragile 
countries and “failed” states emerging from severe crises or civil war, we begin today to realize that the 
 disaster in Afghanistan is largely due to mistakes made by the Western coalition, and in particular, to the 
disorganization of its development support efforts in this country. In this uncompromising article, Serge 
Michailof undertakes a systematic analysis of international donors’ mistakes in Afghanistan between 2002 
and 2010. His purpose is to draw lessons that can be applied more broadly and thus avoid repeating the same 
mistakes in other contexts.
After reminding the reader that aid eficiency in countries emerging from a crisis is a source of considerable 
disappointment, and that not only promises and lashy announcements but considerable inancial resources 
are required to rebuild those countries, Serge Michailof next makes a candid analysis of donors’ poor 
 performance in Afghanistan. He emphasizes the lack of a coherent strategy and clear goals to guide their 
actions. He stresses the fact that ensuring the safety of the people and providing a local administration is 
critical in these circumstances, although largely forgotten by donors. Since foreign forces cannot fulill this 
need indeinitely, building reliable national security forces is essential. He then describes the consequences 
of the lack of coordination and strategic management of aid, which results in severe inconsistencies in 
 resource allocation, and proposes a new aid model to address such deiciencies. From the Afghan case ana­
lysis, he draws general conclusions regarding the principles governing aid coordination in fragile countries 
and the inadequacy of the millennium development goals as a conceptual framework in such contexts. He 
stresses the dire consequences of approaches governed by donors’ short­term concerns, which end up 
 establishing a parallel donor­driven administration that can only weaken State institutions. While State 
building requires founding modern institutions, this issue is paradoxically, neglected by the international aid 
community, even though this is feasible in dificult contexts as demonstrated by a number of successful 
achievements in Afghanistan. He then criticizes the supericial formal type of democracy systematically 
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THE CHALLENGE OF RECONSTRUCTING ‘FAILED’ 
STATES: What lessons can be learned from the  
mistakes made by the international aid community  
in Afghanistan?
Text of the presentation given at the Humanitarian Forum, 1 October 2010, Annecy, France1
COMMENTARY
 1 Text of the presentation given at the Humanitarian Forum, 1 October 2010, Annecy, France. This presenta­
tion was inspired by various publications I have written since 2007, and particularly chapter 6 of the book 
I published (with Alexis Bonnel): “Notre Maison Brûle au Sud, que peut faire l’Aide au Développement” 
 Fayard/Commentaires 2010, the chapter “Le Déi de la reconstruction de l’Administration en Afghanistan” 
that I wrote in the collective publication “Etats and Sociétés fragiles” JM Chataigner and H Magro, Karthala 
2007, and various articles that are cited in these pages.
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imposed by the international  community in such contexts and stresses the need for grassroots democracy. Drawing from this 
extremely in­depth analysis, he inally makes a series of general recommendations  intended for both oficial development aid 
institutions and non­government organizations (NGOs) that are currently  facing and will continue to face similar challenges in 
other areas of the world.
Keywords. Afghanistan, oficial development aid, state building, aid coordination, failed states, fragile states, counterinsur­
gency strategy, strategic management of aid.
This article is also posted on the Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International website (www.ferdi.fr)
1 Aid performance in ‘failed’ States  
 is disappointing
For more than forty years, developing countries have expe­
rienced a series of wars and armed conlicts. These have 
 essentially been internal conlicts like in Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, Rwanda, and Colombia, although they have had a 
strong tendency to involve neighboring countries. Many such 
conlicts have affected countries without signiicantly upset­
ting the ability of the government to continue functioning. 
This is currently the case, for example, in the Ivory Coast, 
even though, paradoxically, this country’s public administra­
tion cannot measure up to what it was thirty years ago. In 
these cases, reconstruction is essentially an issue of political 
stabilization and ‘good’ policies facilitating private invest­
ment recovery. In these situations, the Oficial Development 
Assistance (ODA) plays its traditional role: its goal is to 
 enable these countries, some of which, like the Ivory Coast, 
have lost several decades in terms of development, to make 
up for lost time.
But very often, the conlicts are either the cause or the 
 result of a progressive collapse of the State – not only a i­
nancial bankruptcy, but an administrative, organizational 
and  institutional collapse. In these countries, State institu­
tions, like the police, justice system and army, and  inancial 
institutions, like the treasury, customs, taxes and central 
bank, are dysfunctional. Public health and educational 
 services no longer function properly. The distribution of 
electricity or drinking water is almost nonexistent. The 
roads are largely impassable as soon as one leaves the 
 capital, and the transport system is in ruins. The social situ­
ation is frightful. The economy has all but shut down. 
These are what we now tend to call ‘failed’ States, like 
Cambodia in 1979, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) and Afghanistan in 2001, and Haiti and Somalia still 
today. These situations represent regional and even global 
public challenges for the international community, which 
does not know how to address these problems and some­
times, by its own interventions, tends to do more harm 
than good.
The failed States usually collapse for a wide variety of 
 reasons. Often, such as in the DRC, the government structure 
that implodes was already signiicantly corroded by its colo­
nial history2, corruption and catastrophic policies. Civil war 
 2 As illustrated by the terrifying description of Congo’s colonization 
in: “King Leopold’s Ghost” Adam Hoschild, Mariner Books, New 
York, 1998. 
in these cases merely accelerates an advanced process of de­
cay. The exceptional duration of conlicts that have some­
times lasted for more than a generation, like in Afghanistan, 
explains the destruction of institutions and the weakness of 
the government structure. Over these long periods, the disap­
pearance of educational systems has had a particularly severe 
impact on human capital.
Over the past dozen years, international aid has been 
 widely mobilized to try and sustainably restore order in these 
countries, revive their economies and reduce the  widespread 
misery of the population. But these reconstruction tasks 
clearly present a particular challenge. In spite of the consider­
able political, inancial, economic, technical and military 
 efforts that have been made, representing tens of billions of 
dollars to date, the results are on the whole very disappoint­
ing. Although the DRC is gradually stabilizing, it remains 
precariously fragile and unstable. But the most  troubling case 
undoubtedly remains that of Afghanistan, which is once again 
sinking into a spiral of insecurity and war. Unfortunately, in 
Central Asia as well as in Africa and other regions of the 
world, other countries are following the same path as 
Afghanistan; and yet what is most troubling is that in these 
countries, as we will see later, aid seems to end up being part 
of the problem, instead of sustainably  resolving challenges. 
I will illustrate my presentation with an analysis of a 
 concrete example, which is the failure of the international 
community’s action in Afghanistan since it began at the end 
of 2001. I will successively examine the need for a more 
 coherent intervention strategy; the urgency of initially restor­
ing security; the lack of focus that accompanies aid objec­
tives in this context; the lack of strategic management and 
strategic allocation of resources which are largely wasted; the 
inadequacy of the conceptual framework offered by the 
 standard poverty reduction strategies developed in the con­
text of the millennium development goals; the harmful  effects 
of the donor community’s short term bias; the critical impor­
tance of reconstructing or constructing a modern government 
structure; and inally, the complexity of the political reforms 
needed to establish the legitimacy of authority. I will lastly 
attempt to draw general conclusions and propose more spe­
ciic recommendations from this analysis for NGOs. 
2 Real inancial resources, and not promises  
 or media hype, are needed to reconstruct a  
 failed State after a conlict 
Restoring sustainable peace in ‘failed’ countries and territo­
ries at the end of a civil war is a task that now commonly 
mobilizes efforts on the part of the international community. 
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This issue has become a major subject of attention; the 
World Bank will make it the main theme of its World 
Development Report in 2011. For the NATO partners en­
gaged in Afghanistan, this issue has become critical. Although 
considerable resources have been mobilized by now, the situ­
ation is still deteriorating in many regions or at best stabiliz­
ing. Despite progress made under the new leadership of 
General Petraeus who has at last, but very late in the process, 
been able to impose a comprehensive and coherent counter­
insurgency approach, the failure of the Western coalition (as 
of early 2011) is now a serious possibility. 
An analysis of the events that have occurred in Afghanistan 
since the end of 2001 shows that the deterioration is clearly 
related to factors linked to Afghan domestic policies and a 
maia system that now corrupts its regime. It is also related 
to regional policies, in light of the Pakistan army’s ambi­
tions in this country3. But the very serious mistakes that 
have been made not only by the Bush administration, but 
also by the entire international community since 2001, go a 
long way  towards explaining the present disaster. These 
have been  traditional mistakes made by a community of 
 donors that have managed aid to Afghanistan according to 
its usual  procedures and that have consequently mishandled 
considerable inancial and human resources. All of us have 
therefore collectively wasted what was undoubtedly a 
unique opportunity. Of course, we must harbor no illusions. 
There will  never be a standard magic bullet that, given 
enough money and technology, could easily put these coun­
tries on the road to peace and prosperity. In all cases, the task 
is challenging, for it is usually necessary to invent and 
 experiment in real­life contexts. However, common charac­
teristics also clearly emerge in these situations and it is 
 important to identify them.
The irst question that should be asked is whether adequate 
inancial resources have been mobilized. This question is 
 important because, under the principles of aid selectivity, aid 
lows should be directed towards the most eficiently­ 
managed countries. As a result, fragile countries and failed 
states are often neglected by donors. In most cases, the latter 
do not become interested until the situation is so degraded 
that the country reminds the international community of its 
existence through massacres, terrorism and the regional 
spread of insecurity, i.e. when it is already too late to easily 
undertake effective action. 
Another issue is linked to false promises. In the context of 
the well­publicized donor conferences, the promises of aid 
that are regularly made by donor countries usually involve 
the sum of highly disparate elements that inally do not add to 
much in terms of new money. This is for instance the case of 
the cancellations of debts that never had any chance of being 
paid, emergency aid, high cost technical assistance spending 
or previously­programed aid which was already in the 
 disbursement channels. This means that it is very dificult to 
accurately determine, based on oficial announcements, the 
 3 On this subject, see the extraordinary publication by Ahmed Rashid: 
“Descent into Chaos – The US and the Failure of Nation Building in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia”, Ahmed Rashid, Viking, 2008. 
amount of new money that will effectively be available. This 
practice of promising aid, which in reality is a form of false 
aid, is commonly practiced by France, which thereby 
 attempts to conceal the disappearance of its grant resources 
for its  bilateral aid. This being said, the hype related to aid 
 complicates the work of local authorities and increases local 
 public scepticism regarding both aid and local leaders since 
the population obviously does not see ensuing concrete 
 results from theoretical aid lows. 
In the case of Afghanistan, money has not been a major 
problem, at least… with regards to military spending. 
Indeed, from 2002 to 2009, the United States spent around 
$230  billion to conduct military operations. It is currently 
spending over $200­300 million per day for this purpose4. 
However inancial support for the country’s development has 
apparently not been lacking either, since from 2002 until the 
end of 2007, the international community has mobilized 
some $50 billion, half to reconstruct local security forces 
(mainly the army) and the other half for development aid. To 
give an order of magnitude, the sum of $50 billion corre­
sponds to about 10 years worth of World Bank aid for the 
whole of Sub­Saharan Africa – while recently discussing 
these igures with a Congolese Minister, he was clearly 
stunned by such amounts. To the $50 billion, which are quite 
considerable, at least on the surface, were added the inanc­
ing promises obtained in the 2008 donors’ conference in 
Paris and 2010 conference in Kabul, i.e. approximately 
 another $20 to 30 billion. Finally there has also been no 
shortage of technical support: around $3 billion were indeed 
spent on civilian technical assistance from 2002 to the end 
of 2009, and more than 2,000 non­governmental organiza­
tions (NGOs) at some time have been working there. For a 
country whose oficial GDP (excluding the drug economy) is 
around $10 billion, the scope of this international support is 
really impressive. 
However, the gap between military spending and civilian 
development spending is immense. At end of 20075, when 
the security situation seriously deteriorated, only $14.7 bil­
lion in development aid had actually been disbursed out of 
the $25 billion that had been promised, around $10 billion 
remaining mere promises or lingering in payment channels. 
Basically the ratio between military spending and develop­
ment spending was around 1 to 9, which puts the develop­
ment aid effort into perspective. We should also note that 
the quality of this aid, much of which was tied6 in the case 
of American aid, which was by far the largest share, left 
much to be desired. We will see later in this presentation 
that in the end, the amount of effective development spend­
ing was quite small and did not cover many of the most 
 urgent needs. 
 4 Note here that for General McChrystal, this military effort was great­
ly insuficient and has historically been under­inanced. It is true that the 
annual cost of the War in Iraq in 2008 ($140 billion) totalled more than 
all military spending in Afghanistan combined from 2002 to 2007.
 5 The igures given are in current dollars.
 6 According to the OECD DAC in 2006, 44% of aid to Afghanistan 
was still tied (conditional to purchases in the donor country). 
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3 But there also needs to be a strategy  
 to drive a reconstruction effort 
The irst mistake that was made by the international com­
munity in Afghanistan, or rather by the highest American 
leaders (G.W. Bush and D. Rumsfeld, against the urging of 
Colin Powell, the Secretary of State), was made immediately 
after the military victory that led to the fall of the Taliban 
regime in late 2001. This mistake was to de facto subcontract 
security responsibilities in the country to the Northern 
Alliance’s back­up forces, to which the US had subcontract­
ed land­based operations in 2001 along with ‘commanders’ 
and  warlords who had sworn allegiance to the coalition. 
Absorbed in the preparation of their Iraq adventure, 
American leaders at the start of 2002 withdrew a large per­
centage of their contingent from Afghanistan even though 
this contingent was  already quite small. They also initially 
limited the security mandate of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) to the city of Kabul.
By doing so, they ended up leaving only 8,000 men to en­
sure the security of a mountainous country larger than France 
with 30 million inhabitants, which was recovering from more 
than 20 years of fratricidal war and whose infrastructure was 
devastated. The ratio of international forces to the population 
was therefore in the range of 1 per 3,750 inhabitants, know­
ing that this ratio is even misleading as the mandate of the 
forces was not to oversee the population’s safety but to pur­
sue members of Al­Qaeda. I will simply point out that this 
ratio at the end of the Kosovo war was 1 to 40. At the end of 
the East Timor conlict it was 1 to 112, and at the end of the 
conlict in Bosnia it was 1 to 205. Such a situation created a 
dramatic security void across the country. Even worse, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in its ‘war on terrorism’, 
inanced and armed many ‘commanders’, in fact almost 
 anybody who promised help in the  pursuit of terrorists, with 
 experience subsequently proving that these warlords mostly 
used American support and the Air Force’s ire­power to 
 settle old tribal disputes or local conlicts of power. Under 
these conditions, all manners of crooks, including minor and 
major warlords, rapidly recreated the type of maia order that 
had already led the entire country to chaos in 1992 after the 
fall of the Najibullah  regime7, a chaos that had facilitated the 
Taliban’s conquest of the country. American policy, instead 
of helping to create a modern State, actually strengthened a 
Merovingian­like system of power that ultimately and very 
paradoxically corresponded, from an institutional viewpoint, 
to a regression from Taliban rule.
4 Ensuring personal safety and a minimum  
 level of local ‘governance’ is undoubtedly  
 the most urgent task 
The fact that no attempt was made in 2002 to establish an 
international peace force together with a provisional civil­
ian administration and some inancial resources in order to 
urgently launch an initial rural rehabilitation program is 
 7 Which had been set up by the Soviets shortly before their departure.
quite simply unbelievable. This negligence negated all the 
experience that had been acquired over the past thirty years 
in the area of post­conlict reconstruction8. In my most 
 recent book9, I explained how international experience 
clearly shows that State failure usually starts with the 
 degradation of security and the disappearance of local 
State authorities (justice, territorial administration, etc.) in 
 outlying regions. I pointed out that this collapse of the 
structure of government rapidly leads to the establishment 
of militia that turn to maias, raise taxes, replace the failing 
government structure and erode its legi timacy. The Taliban 
regime had at least widely crushed or  controlled the maias 
and ensured security and a degree of justice (albeit it expe­
ditious) in the parts of the country that were under its 
 control. In most of the south and east of Afghanistan, a 
similar development, paired with Western shortcomings in 
this area, conirmed the failure of the Afghan State, which 
was already badly off after a few years under the Taliban’s 
obscurant regime. 
Here it is instructive to compare America’s negligence of 
these security, justice and territorial administration matters 
with the approach that was implemented by Vietnamese 
 leaders to bring peace to Cambodia. The Vietnamese had 
 captured Cambodia in 1979 to topple the Pol Pot regime, 
which for them had become a nuisance. Like the Americans 
in Afghanistan in 2001, the Vietnamese made short work of 
Pol Pot’s army. But unlike the Americans in Afghanistan, 
they were obsessed with the fear of seeing a Khmer Rouge 
rebellion resume and encroach deep in the countryside, with 
the rebels taking advantage of the security chaos to expand 
and make Vietnamese control impossible. They consequently 
imposed strict rule in Cambodia’s rural areas through a 
strong military presence and the rapid reconstruction of a ter­
ritorial administration under their rule. Owing to the lack of 
Cambodian civil servants (pro­Vietnamese Communists were 
massacred by the Pol Pot regime), they did not hesitate to call 
upon Khmer Rouge personnel under their close supervision 
to assume this leadership10. 
In fact, the ‘light footprint’11 principle, i.e. a very minor 
foreign presence, which was initially promoted by both 
D. Rumsfeld and the United Nations in Afghanistan, turned 
out to be a grave error. This principle never kept international 
institutions’ SUVs from congesting the streets of Kabul; but 
 8 The Bush administration’s institutional memory loss with regard to 
end­of­conlict procedures and stabilization and reconstruction actions 
has been denounced by Francis Fukuyama: “Nation Building, Beyond 
Afghanistan and Irak”, John Hopkins, 2006. See also Ashraf Ghani and 
Clare Lockhart: “Fixing Failed States, a framework for rebuilding a 
fractured world”, Oxford University Press, 2008.
 9 “Notre maison brûle au Sud, que peut faire l’aide au développe­
ment?”, S Michailof, A Bonnel, Fayard 2010.
 10 On this subject see: “Cambodia after the Khmer Rouges, Inside the 
Politics of Nation Building”, Evan Gottseman, Silkworm Books 2004, 
and “Cambodia, Report from a Striken Land”, Henry Kamm, Arcade 
Publishing, 1998.
 11 For a very interesting discussion about the error represented by the 
‘light footprint’ option, see Seth Jones’ fascinating publication: “In the 
Graveyard of Empires – America’s war in Afghanistan”, Norton & 
Cie, 2010.
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it did preclude the establishment of a regime that would 
 ensure security, local justice and minimal administrative su­
pervision in the ield. Of course, the establishment of a large 
security force and civilian administrative resources would 
have been an extremely dificult task in this huge and moun­
tainous country. But after the fall of a discredited Taliban 
 regime, there was such demand for order and justice that even 
a strong foreign presence, if presented as temporary, would 
have been accepted. 
Over time, as security deteriorated across the country, on 
account of crime, rackets, vendettas, gangland killing, the 
violence of small warlords and the return of Taliban forces 
taking advantage of the chaos, the Western coalition attempt­
ed to implement a dual response: military on the one hand, 
and ‘developmental military’ on the other hand. In the irst 
few years, this military action, on which I will not dwell, was 
essentially undertaken by the American forces in ‘Operation 
Enduring Freedom’, which operated according to a strict mil­
itary logic. Moreover, and surprisingly, these forces inter­
vened without any cooperation whatsoever from other 
American forces and the ISAF allies or Afghan and foreign 
civilians. They also showed total disregard for Afghan cul­
tural sensitivities. With the general degradation of security, 
the ISAF was then put back on centre stage and was hence­
forth directly engaged in the military effort. It is now com­
monly known that the collateral damage that was caused by 
this foreign military intervention succeeded in alienating the 
rural Afghan population. 
5 International forces cannot sustainably meet  
 the need for security and local administration 
The action I describe as ‘developmental military’ aimed to 
ill the security void and meet the most urgent reconstruction 
needs when the irst problems arose in this area. It primarily 
relied on the establishment of ‘Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams’ (PRTs). These structures irst ensure a military ield 
presence intended to protect the activity of development 
agencies. Secondly, they directly undertake minor develop­
ment actions inanced with military budgets. The establish­
ment of these PRTs (there are currently 25 PRTs run by 
13 different countries) gave rise to lively debates and sharp 
criticism from the NGOs active in the ield. The latter were 
irst concerned that they would be confused with the mili­
tary units and that the neutrality to which they are rightly 
attached would be affected, with the additional risk that their 
personnel would be targeted by the insurrection. They then 
criticized the non­lasting and non­‘appropriated’ (by the 
populations) character of the development actions undertak­
en by military oficers, whose expertise in this area is natu­
rally limited. These criticisms are understandable. But there 
are also few good solutions for undertaking development 
 actions in an insecure environment. Experience, moreover, 
has shown that the clearly afirmed neutrality of NGOs has 
not protected them from deliberate attacks12. 
 12 For example, ive Médecins sans frontières (MSF) employees 
were shot down in 2004 by a local commander who, according to the 
On the whole, contrary to what may be derived from 
 oficial statements, this program’s overall results have been, 
at least until very recently, extremely disappointing, to the 
point that when the leaders of some major aid agencies in 
Kabul are questioned in private, they consider that these 
 programs should be radically reoriented or even shut down 
in areas where insurrection has not yet become a serious 
problem. But these operations also continue for reasons that 
involve the NATO countries’ communication policies (what 
else are they supposed to show to famous visitors?). Perhaps 
the disappointment stems less from a radical conceptual error 
than from inadequately deined implementation terms, a tar­
dy launch, long insuficient resources and especially working 
methods that have led these PRTs to prolong their presence 
and stand in for defaulting local authorities, while they should 
have been a temporary solution. So many mistakes have been 
made related to this type of approach, whose implementation 
could be extended to other countries and contexts, that I will 
present a brief inventory.
Regarding the implementation terms, the irst criticism 
that can be made of this program is its lack of coherence 
and  ultimately its ‘amateurism’13. Lack of coherence as 
each  allied contingent has designed and implemented its 
own program without paying much heed to the other de­
tachments’ actions. In the PRT program there are therefore 
British, German Dutch and American approaches, for a to­
tal of virtually 13 different approaches. Although there is 
no French PRT, in the Kapisa valley there is a French ap­
proach combi ning security and development actions that 
has recently  embraced a fairly similar philosophy. Of 
course, experiments were necessary to develop the most 
effective approaches in this novel ield. But compartmen­
talization has meant that these experiences could not be 
shared to obtain a doctrine that would be common to the 
ISAF’s various forces.
The consequences of this lack of doctrine and the expe­
rimental character of the approaches have been worsened 
by the rapid turnover (generally every 6 to 12 months) of 
the military units. Each PRT leader, although initially very 
 inexperienced in this area, has implemented his own 
 approach, largely based on his own vision, placing the 
 emphasis on military action, civilian development action, 
or the protection of his forces resulting in a ‘bunkerization’ 
logic. Even on the level of security actions, there is virtu­
ally no prospect of  coherence as the various contingents are 
subject to different rules of engagement; for example, 
German forces are not  authorized to use force except for 
self­defense. 
subsequent investigation, merely wanted to afirm his power over the 
region to the district police chief. This assassination and the govern­
ment’s lack of response caused MSF to stop its activities, with the 
 result that its 1,400 local employees found themselves jobless. In 
2008, more than thirty NGO employees were killed and around a 
 hundred were kidnapped.
 13 On this subject, see the very perceptive analysis “A Mean to What 
Ends? Why PRTs are Peripheral to the Bigger Political Challenges in 
Afghanistan”, Barbara J. Stapleton, Journal of Military and Strategic 
Studies, Fall 2007. 
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Lastly, these operations have entrusted military oficers, 
who have little knowledge of development issues, with 
 responsibilities for which they were and are inadequately 
 prepared. Most PRTs were and still lack structured civilian 
technical teams, with rural works engineers, public works 
specialists, anthropologists, procurement experts and project 
managers capable of preparing appropriate development 
 actions that could then be managed by the beneiciaries. This 
criticism should, however, now be qualiied as the Americans, 
Canadian and British have recently been expanding their 
PRTs by recruiting solid civilian teams; learning from past 
mistakes, they are now developing a doctrine. Under the 
‘ civilian surge’ that has been promised by President Obama, 
the American PRTs should soon be properly equipped with 
technical personnel, even though there has been no inrush 
of volunteers.
The second criticism is that this program was obviously 
launched much too late. The country literally should have 
been covered with PRTs from the start of 2002. And yet their 
gradual installation did not start until 2004­2005, and they 
still cover the country only partially in 2010. In the mean­
time, rising insecurity has caused them to interrupt their de­
velopment actions in hostile regions where their personnel 
are practically conined to urban centers. 
The third criticism is that the PRTs were allotted extremely 
insuficient inancial resources14 for too long, while American 
aid was largely wasted on large contracts. It is true that since 
2007, American, British and Canadian PRTs have been 
 adequately funded. But this is not the case for the PRTs of 
other nations. And unfortunately in this type of situation, it 
is not possible to make up for lost time. 
The fourth criticism is that the PRTs, by virtue of their 
nature, could not meet the population’s demands for better 
local governance. Constant complaints regarding the lack 
of justice, police violence and corrupted district chiefs 
were and are still ignored. Western military oficers, who 
incidentally have little knowledge of these problems, can­
not participate in their resolution when a ledgling local 
administration has been established and is supposed to 
handle them but does very little. This point is clearly 
 acknowledged in General McChrystal’s report, but there 
remains the question of how to resolve it. The situation can 
be contrasted with the main Taliban groups’ surveillance 
over their parallel administration’s behavior, which allows 
them to dismiss leaders who are too corrupt or display 
criminal behavior15. 
The ifth criticism underlines that the actions of the 
PRTs, and of many of the main donors, have taken place 
without meaningful supervision and coordination with 
Afghan  institutions. Their actions have been developed 
outside of local budget procedures and without the integra­
tion of  regional priorities as deined by local authorities. 
 14 In 2004, the budget devoted to American PRT development actions 
was only $52 million for a total authorised US aid budget of more than 
$2 billion!
 15 On this subject, see the remarkable study: “The Taliban’s Winning 
Strategy in Afghanistan”, Gilles Dorronsoro, Carnegie Endowment, 2009. 
Faced with the  frequent failure of Afghan institutions, the 
PRTs took their place and by doing so weakened the Afghan 
 institutions even further. 
All things considered, we can see that the PRTs, which 
should have merely been a stop-gap measure, during the 
2 to 3 years it would have taken to build capable Afghan 
 institutions and initiate international aid programs, have 
turned out to be a permanent mechanism. Given the weak 
institutional progress that has been made in the country­
side, it is hard to imagine how they could withdraw without 
many of their achievements collapsing in the process. The 
mission of the PRTs, which in reality has remained vague, 
should have privileged support for nascent Afghan institu­
tions, and particularly the police and local law forces, 
which Western countries should have been prepared to 
 support and inance. In particular, the PRTs should have 
supported technically and inanced emerging provincial 
bodies: provincial development committees and especially 
the Community Development Councils created by the 
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation. By widely ignoring these 
institutions, the approach has contributed to marginalizing 
them. Once again, these failings are being corrected, but 
it will be hard to make up for the time that has been lost 
and for the weakness of Afghan local institutions which 
 remains appalling. 
6 The construction of modern national  
 security and modern local government  
 institutions is essential
As soon as the decision to intervene in Afghanistan was 
made, i.e. in mid­September 2001, the American administra­
tion should have seriously examined the issue of the coun­
try’s administration during the transitional period from the 
expulsion of the Taliban to the actual establishment of a new 
power. Let us remember that the American authorities had 
carefully planned the administration of Germany and Japan 
in 1945; they had even planned the administration of France 
in 1944 to the great indignation of General de Gaulle. Such 
an analysis would have revealed ive facts: 1) Once the 
Taliban were ousted from power, it was necessary to meet 
local needs for public administration in rural areas. 2) As in 
all fragile countries at the end of a conlict, demand for 
 security and local administration would be the principal de­
mand from a population that had been traumatized by more 
than 20 years of war and violence. 3) The demand for secu­
rity and local administration would require the rapid 
 establishment of an army, a police and local law enforcement 
agency, a territorial administration and a well funded minis­
try of rural reconstruction. 4) Since the time needed to create 
such institutions was at least 3 years, a provisional PRT­type 
system would have to be established urgently to ill in the 
most serious gaps and would require the mobilization of 
 substantial military and civilian resources. 5) But the provi­
sional administrative system would then need to strengthen 
the nascent institutions and plan to self­dissolve and in no 
case replace failing institutions. 
At the beginning of 2011, more than 9 years after the fall 
of the Taliban regime, if we review the status of Afghan 
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State institutions that contribute to personal safety and local 
administration – institutions that should have been opera­
tional in 2005/2006 – the situation is disastrous. One can 
even wonder where, aside from margins and fees for 
 subcontractors, the $25 billion went that were in theory 
 devoted to these tasks. Out of all of the institutions that 
were needed for the presence of an Afghan State in rural 
areas, only the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development (MRRD) was  actually created with traditional 
aid funding. In less than a 3­year period, the MRRD, devel­
oped and managed by a  minister demonstrating both 
 charisma and managerial capacities, functioned as a mod­
ern and eficient institution and  effectively covered the 
 entire country. But its activities were under­inanced, which 
was the case for even the  remarkable program it quickly 
 established, the ‘National Solidarity Program’, which still 
 provides small grants to over 17,000 local communities. 
Yet this program is particularly important. In spite of its 
unfortunately modest inancial contributions, it indeed 
 facilitates the establishment of a grassroots democracy 
through the creation of development committees which 
manage these grants. The fact that this institution has func­
tioned remarkably well16 proves that the establishment of 
modern institutions in a short period is entirely possible 
even in very dificult environments. A structured Afghan 
 machinery of government, including at a local level, could 
have been operational in 2005/2006, precisely at the time 
when security chaos started encouraging the return of the 
Taliban. But again, this goal should have been clearly stat­
ed and shared by the international community and Afghan 
 political leaders. Instead, lacking alternatives as no inter­
national forces were available, both the CIA, which was a 
 major player from 2002­2004, and President Karzai made 
the political choice to enter into an alliance with local 
 warlords and ‘commanders’, an alliance that is entirely 
 incompatible with the construction of a modern adminis­
tration. The rest of the international community could not 
or did not wish to react.
7 The international community was unwilling  
 to provide the needed long-term commitment  
 to fund an army capable of meeting the  
 expected challenges 
Aside from the MRRD, several other modern institutions 
were also rapidly established beginning in 2002. First the 
Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, thanks to another 
energetic Minister, Mr Ashraf Ghani, and strong USAID 
 support, as will be explained later. Second the army and the 
National Directorate of Security (NDS), which is the 
 country’s intelligence institution. The NDS was created by 
an  energetic leader, Amrullah Saleh, a former protégé of 
Commander Massoud who staffed this intelligence service 
 16 As do the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank and the NDS, 
which were also established as modern institutions at the same time. But 
it should be noted that recent management changes made at the MRRD 
seem to have weakened this institution.
by recruiting personnel based on merit. This directorate has 
regularly published highly perceptive analyses of the situa­
tion. A fairly well­structured Afghan army was also set up 
with strong American support; but for a long time, its size 
remained completely unsuitable compared to the challenges 
at hand. During the irst few years, the forces of certain 
 warlords such as ‘General’ Fahim (who was incidentally 
Defense Minister at the time) and ‘General’ Dostom, were 
numerically bigger and better equipped, including with 
heavy weapons. This army slowly grew starting in 2004 
 under the impetus of the new Defense Minister, Mr. Wardak. 
But it was initially limited to some 30,000 men due to the 
expected Afghan State’s budget constraints, for neither the 
United States nor other donors wanted to make a long­term 
commitment to fund it.
American support in this area was unequal and limited17. 
In 2005, Rumsfeld refused Wardak’s request to increase the 
army to 70,000 men18. At one point, the United States even 
requested that the Afghan budget cover its cost, which 
 created a panic at the inance ministry. The army now 
 oficially has around 120,000 men, but in reality the actual 
operational force is smaller. Plans are currently to increase 
the force to 240,000 men as quickly as possible in the context 
of the new American strategy. But after all the time that has 
been lost, one can clearly question whether it is realistic to 
expect this ramp­up to occur in such a short time frame. 
Military morale has in fact been affected by the general 
 security decline,  rumors of American withdrawal, and 
Taliban threats against soldiers’ families, which means that 
few Pashtuns are now volunteering and the army is losing is 
role as an inter­ethnic melting pot. On the whole, the ISAF’s 
Western armies have had to make the bulk of the military 
effort, as the Taliban have penetrated the country. By doing 
so, in the eyes of the population, they have gradually turned 
into an occupying army, bombing and raiding the country’s 
houses. Since an American GI in Afghanistan costs a mini­
mum of $250,000 per year versus around $5,000 for an 
Afghan soldier, we understand that the international 
 community’s refusal to initially agree to provide long­term 
funding for the creation of an army tailored to the country’s 
size and security requirements was at the very least a 
poor cost­beneit calculation. 
8 The division of responsibilities among  
 coalition countries proved to be a disaster
Let us proceed with our review of institutions. In the 
 framework of the country’s reconstruction, a system for the 
 division of responsibilities among donor countries had 
been  adopted. But the donor countries that were involved 
had grossly underestimated the responsibilities they were 
 17 After the 2003 departure of General Eikenberry who was initially in 
charge of coordinating US support for the army, American Air Force 
generals with no expertise in this area took the reins.
 18 At the same time, while the Taliban was installing the irst compo­
nents of its political infrastructure in the southern part of the country, 
Rumsfeld transferred yet another thousand American soldiers to Iraq.
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 assuming in this process. For example, the reform of 
Afghanistan’s justice system was entrusted to Italy. We can 
wonder what may have become of Italy’s aid for the justice 
system which is still a disaster characterized by widespread 
incompetence and corruption. The establishment of a local 
justice system, which could have easily relied on traditional 
codes, obviously did not receive the international attention 
that was necessary. But it is above all the state of the police 
that is catastrophic19 and poses an extraordinary problem. 
Germany, which hosted the Bonn conference in 2001, was 
expected to take charge and restore an effective police 
force. And yet the police force is commonly considered to 
be the country’s main racketeer and one of the main partici­
pants in drug traficking. 
Here the entire international community is incredibly 
guilty. The division of responsibilities between members of 
the Western coalition proved to be particularly disastrous. 
Germany, poorly estimating the scope of the problem, did no 
more than provide some training and technical assistance to a 
force that needed to be completely rehabilitated, beginning 
with removal of its top leaders and the Ministry of Interior’s 
management structure. Starting in 2004, faced with an 
 upsurge of complaints about the police’s behavior and the 
weakness of German support, the United States started pay­
ing attention to the problem. But in fact, the United States has 
no federal guard or federal police force capable of providing 
this type of institutional support. The Americans therefore 
 subcontracted this support task to a private security irm 
(Dyncorp) with no serious institutional development experi­
ence in a country like Afghanistan and whose concern was 
just to fulill a technical assistance contract whose objectives 
were given in ‘outputs’ (number of trained police oficers) 
and not in concrete results. Furthermore, various US admin­
istrations fought over supervision of this operation. In 2004, 
Rumsfeld did not support Interior Minister Jalali who re­
quested to “clean the government, the Ministry of Interior 
and the administration”. He also did not want to confront 
President Karzai, eager not to jeopardize his alliances with 
local warlords and ‘commanders’20. It was not until 2008, six 
years too late, that this clean­up of the Augean stables was 
inally undertaken. But the recent removal of Minister Hanif 
Atmar, who had undertaken this exceptionally dificult task 
so late in the reconstruction process, and the lack of high­
level political will in this area, raises serious doubts as to the 
likelihood that this task will be successfully completed. Once 
again, precious years have been lost. 
9 Extremely weak local government structures  
 are colliding with maias and ‘strong-men’
The local government structure has also suffered from a lack 
of inancial and human resources, the disorder and corruption 
of the Ministry of Interior and the nepotism that determined 
 19 The “Economist intelligence unit” October 2008 report writes: “The 
state of the police is abysmal…”
 20 This refusal caused Minister Jalali to resign and go into exile in the 
United States in 2005.
the choice of its leaders. It was not partially brought back 
under control until 2007, when it was removed from the 
Ministry of Interior’s responsibility and entrusted to a serious 
leader. But the choice of local administrators is still far from 
relying on skills­based criteria21 and the overall human and 
material resources are extremely weak. In fact, now that 
some PRTs are properly structured, their actions are ham­
pered by the deteriorating security, the dramatic weakness of 
most Afghan state institutions, the weakness and corruption 
of local government, and the still harmful role played by 
‘strong­men’ at the local level. The latter are former warlords, 
drug trafickers or the famous ‘commanders’, leaders of more 
or less maia­controlled groups with which the current regime 
enters into opportunistic alliances. 
At a local level, among these “commanders”, many are 
simply small thugs who terrorize and swindle the population 
like the famous Algerian ‘emirs’ from 1993 to 1998. At the 
top, some are real ‘godfathers’ who combine tradition and 
modernism in typical Francis Ford Coppola style. I will 
 always remember the royal welcome that was reserved for 
my delegation by Mohamed Atta, who incidentally was 
 appointed governor in his Northern iefdom. He had two 
 satellite phones and a lap top within reach, and we departed 
for lunch in his residence/palace in a column of Mercedes 
SUVs with tinted windows and pick­ups illed with armed 
men. I did not have the bad taste, given the quality of the 
 reception, to ask him if it was his governor’s salary that 
 permitted this lifestyle… As Ariane Quentier summarizes in 
a remarkable eyewitness book22: “by deciding to bomb from 
above while delegating military operations below to Afghan 
middlemen, by refusing to deploy troops, by arming warlords 
while encouraging anti­drug agencies to loosen their control, 
the United States played with ire and was over­conident… 
It also gave the new Afghanistan a terrible signal by placing 
trust in very disreputable individuals”. 
International experience has helped deine ratios for estab­
lishing security in a country with a high risk of civil war 
 resurgence, which was clearly the case of Afghanistan in 
2001. This ratio is around 1 security agent (police oficer, 
military oficer or militiaman) per 50 inhabitants, which im­
plies a need of about 600,000 men for a country like 
Afghanistan23. The new US administration has clearly under­
stood the urgent need to quickly build up a strong local secu­
rity force and the total number of police and army forces has 
increased from 120,000 in July 2007 to 260,000 by November 
2010 which is quite an achievement, even if we car harbor 
serious doubts about the quality of the force. It is quite clear 
that the Afghan budget will never be able to maintain a 
 21 Rumours about the auctioning of district chief positions abound 
in Kabul.
 22 “Afghanistan, au Coeur du Chaos”, Ariane Quentier, Denoël, 2009. 
 23 This igure incidentally corresponds to the numbers that were 
 rapidly reached by the Algerian army and police during the civil war that 
started in 1993, as the Algerian population is approximately the same 
size as the Afghan population. Note that the IMF’s contribution in the 
framework of a macroeconomic adjustment programme and then oil 
revenues helped inance the Algerian military effort. These igures also 
correspond to Iraq’s current security services. 
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600,000 or even a 300,000 force unless oil is to be discov­
ered! But the international community’s refusal to confront 
this type of problem on time and the need to fund the estab­
lishment of security and local administration machinery 
 suited to the context largely explains the situation we are 
 currently faced with. The Obama administration and General 
Petraeus have of course rediscovered these hard facts at the 
end of 2009, just as the Nixon administration had discovered 
them in Vietnam after the 1968 Tet Offensive. But politically, 
in view of the prevailing weariness, the 4 to 5 years needed to 
beef up these institutions are lacking, while the Taliban in the 
meantime has become a force with such a high capacity for 
disruption that a successful outcome is in serious doubt. 
It should be noted that, today, the same unwillingness from 
the international community to confront hard facts is present 
in the DRC. This country’s stability is irst threatened by its 
army’s total lack of discipline and organization, this army 
having been formed by the aggregation of multiple militias 
and gangs of thugs. The overall goal, by integrating them was 
to control them somewhat and by paying some salaries, to 
reduce their intrinsic harmfulness. Rather than properly fund 
and urgently train a “gendarmerie” type force and a modern 
disciplined Congolese army, this same international commu­
nity prefers to pay more than a billion dollars per year to 
 inance the 16,000 unmotivated mercenaries24 from MONUC, 
the United Nations force, whose discipline and ardor in 
 combat are so mediocre that they are incapable of restoring 
order in Kivu. For want of resources and out of lassitude, the 
international community is going to reduce MONUC’s size 
and may withdraw it before the problem of the Congolese 
army and police’s discipline and eficiency has been resolved. 
The same analysis today should bring the international com­
munity in the DRC, which is still focusing on poverty reduc­
tion and particularly on the social sectors, to radically revise 
the order of its priorities. Here again, the construction of a 
modern army and a modern national guard, a respectable 
 justice system and of course a road network in a country 
where 10 of the 11 provincial capitals are connected to the 
capital by air only, should be given a higher priority than 
 anything else. But do donors in these countries have a strate­
gy based on common sense or political correctness?
10 In fragile countries, there is no pilot  
 in control of international aid
We are in fact beginning to understand, through these irst 
examples, that the international community’s activity in a 
country like Afghanistan (but the situation, although much 
less serious, is fairly similar in the DRC) scarcely responds to 
a clear strategic vision under the authority of a clearly identi­
ied coordinator25. First, cooperation between civilians and 
 24 Note that the countries that supply the troops, and not the wretched 
soldiers, pocket the tidy sums paid by the UN.
 25 For a more detailed analysis of these issues see: “The Seven Capital 
Sins of the International Community in Afghanistan, What Went Wrong 
in the Security Development Nexus and What should be the Lessons for 
US Foreign Assistance”, Serge Michailof, The German Marshall Fund 
of the United States, Nov 2008.
military forces is extremely limited, with military forces 
‘waging war’ and with civilians not daring to become 
 involved in institutional construction in areas that are not 
their usual spheres. In fact, they share no common objectives, 
as the former, at least until the arrival of the new American 
administration, have been busy killing or capturing ‘terror­
ists’ while the latter are busy ighting poverty. 
But beyond the thorny issue of civil­military cooperation 
and the lack of an overall strategic vision which would 
 include both security and development issues and that only 
General Petraeus has apparently been able to forcefully put 
forward, there is also the singular problem of strategic vision 
and oversight in purely development­related areas. What, 
concretely, is actually happening? First, contrary to common 
opinion, aid is effective when it concentrates its actions and 
coordinates them properly in speciic areas. It is not by 
chance that currently, more than 7 million Afghan children 
go to school and that progress is now noticeable in public 
health. It is also not by chance that the aid resources admin­
istered by the trust fund that was established by a group of 
donors and is managed by the World Bank (the ‘Afghan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund’ or ARTF) in accordance with re­
vised Afghan procedures are producing satisfactory results 
in multiple  areas. Aid is indeed a rare asset that should be 
used with the goal of maximizing its impact thanks to a 
 careful selection of those sectors and zones that are critical 
to reach a set of  objectives. Nonetheless, while laudable 
 efforts have produced encouraging results in the education 
and health sectors, the fact that there is no overall strategic 
management of international aid resources is plain for all to 
see. In fact, neither its breakdown by sector nor its geogra­
phic breakdown appear to respond to what seem to be the 
most pressing priorities. 
Let us irst examine the sectoral breakdown: Seventy per­
cent of the Afghan population is rural but out of the almost 
$15 billion that were actually disbursed at the end of 2007, 
only around $500 million were disbursed in the agricultural 
sector26. It can indeed be said that to develop agriculture in a 
country like Afghanistan (but this is just as true in the DRC), 
the irst measure to be taken before placing too much money 
in production support is to develop and maintain a network of 
rural roads, as the rural world’s isolation is a problem that is 
as serious as the problem of security. But while donors in 
Afghanistan have effectively, by dint of millions of dollars, 
rebuilt the main strategic road network that was initially 
 established by the Soviets in the 1950s and 1960s, rural roads 
have until recently been largely neglected. For example, out 
of the 50,000 km of rural roads that would essentially be 
 necessary to connect all of the country’s villages to the 
 provincial capitals, only 9,000 Km had been built or rehabili­
tated as of the end of 2007. 
At the current rate of construction/rehabilitation and de­
struction due to a lack of maintenance, a rapid calculation 
 26 This issue is now inally being corrected. During his conference at 
Sciences Po on Nov 23, 2010, General Petraeus whom I challenged on 
this issue considers that about $800 million are now spent on agriculture 
on a yearly basis. But again so much time has been lost! 
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performed by the World Bank in 2008 suggested that it would 
take one century to link all of the country’s villages to its 
provincial capitals. At the present time, the military is making 
major efforts to build rural roads. But the selection criteria 
are related to military and not economic considerations; fur­
thermore, no serious maintenance mechanisms are in place. 
All in all, the isolation of the Afghan rural world still remains 
dramatic in most mountainous regions, as isolated valleys 
cannot enjoy the beneits generated by a gradual development 
of basic education and health services. This isolation also 
prevents them from participating in the national economic 
recovery, from entering trade channels, and from beneiting 
from the recovery of the transit trade. There is, however, one 
exception, which is the opium economy. Opium’s high value 
in relation to its weight means that it is possible to bypass 
roads and simply use backpacks or small donkeys27. 
11 There is no coherence in aid  
 resource allocation
In addition to the lack of massive investment in the construc­
tion of rural roads in the 2002­2007 period, a similar lack of 
massive effort in the rehabilitation and extension of irrigation 
networks is just as outrageous. These networks have in fact 
been severely damaged by the Soviets under their scorched 
earth policy and by a lack of maintenance over the past 
20 years. As a result, many Afghan valleys are confronted 
with a Malthusian crisis. The already staggering natural 
 population growth has been aggravated by the return of most 
of the 5 million people who had sought refuge in Pakistan and 
Iran. This rural population has to cope with both a lack of 
land and its low potential, for want of irrigation and road 
 investments that are necessary to bring in inputs and evacuate 
surpluses. Young people cannot ind work on­site. They are 
forced to crowd into cities, where they increase the mass of 
the urban unemployed, or participate in the drug economy, or 
join the insurrection that offers attractive salaries. The oldest 
have to grow poppy, which alone ensures rural families a 
minimum level of monetary income and guarantees that they 
will have the capacity to buy cereals in the event of a food 
shortage28. An Afghan tribal chief was indeed recently quoted 
in the New York Times: “Most of the Taliban in my area are 
young men who need jobs. We just need to make them busy. 
If we give them work, we can weaken the Taliban”29 
Another example of serious incoherence in the sectoral 
 allocation of international aid is the under­investment in 
the energy sector. It is known that after agriculture, electricity 
is one of the necessary bases of economic development. And 
yet what is the current reality? Nine years after the fall of the 
Taliban regime, most of Afghanistan is still immersed in 
darkness. Even in Kabul, the Energy Minister, Ismail Khan, a 
 27 See “Afghanistan: Economic Incentives and Development Initia­
tives to Reduce Opium Production”, C Ward, D Mansield, P Oldham. 
William Byrd, World Bank/DFID, Feb 2008. 
 28 On this subject, see the study: “Immediate Priority Needs of 
 Vulnerable Farmers engaged in Opium Poppy Cultivation”, Urgence 
Réhabilitation Développement” (URD), Jan 2008.
 29 Hajji Fazul Rahim, quoted by the New York Times, 28 November 2009. 
major warlord (who, in fact, still controls the Herat region), 
was unable to keep the promise he made to supply 8 hours of 
electricity per day for the 2008 Ramadan period. It was not 
until 2010 that Kabul was inally provided with electricity. 
How could one possibly hope to attract investors without 
electricity? And how can the Western world claim to be 
 seriously committed to helping this country if Kabul’s poor 
neighborhoods, which cannot afford private generators, 
 remain immersed in darkness every evening at 7 o’clock? 
What a sign of failure! 
What about the geographic allocation of aid? This allo­
cation followed two types of logic. First, aid was heavily 
 concentrated in Kabul where, in the 2007­2008 Afghan iscal 
year, it reached the exceptional sum of $600 per inhabitant. 
Secondly, it adhered to combat zones. In this same year, it 
indeed reached $450 per inhabitant in the Nimroz and 
Helmand provinces, which were heavily affected by combat, 
and where on the pressing demand of the Western armies 
 engaged in the ield, it attempted to win over ‘hearts and 
minds’. In more peaceful provinces, it remained minor, with 
for example around $50 per inhabitant during this period in 
Wardak. The money has therefore been largely wasted on 
zones where ighting precluded any real development, and 
this policy did not focus on rebuilding regions at peace. It so 
happens that the ‘peaceful’ region of Wardack has since 
switched over to insurrection. Many villagers have noted that 
only insurrection in fact seems to attract aid.
Last criticism: Most aid short-circuits the Afghan authori-
ties. The problem is surely not simple. The billions of dollars 
that slowly circulate through the channels of international 
aid remind us of the challenge of rapidly and eficiently 
 using donors’ dollars in a country where technical and insti­
tutional capacities have collapsed. Even when rapidly 
 disbursed, aid can end up blocked in the channels of the 
Afghan administrative machinery, become lost in these 
channels, or take years to reach its recipients. In these 
 circumstances, international aid needs to make a trade­off 
between the short and long term. For very short­term effec­
tiveness, the American methods of contracts signed without 
calls for tenders, on the ly, with companies capable of 
 implementing projects in tight time frames, are understand­
able. It is very expensive, there is a worrying lack of trans­
parency, but in the end, it produces results, like large roads. 
The Chinese, incidentally, use a  similar practice. 
But this approach has considerable disadvantages. It can be 
used for little other than major infrastructure work and, as we 
noted above, there are hidden costs related to this practice. 
The worst thing is that no local institutional capacities are 
created, particularly to ensure result sustainability. Who, for 
example, will perform maintenance work and with what 
 resources? Furthermore, local authorities are completely 
short­circuited and powerlessly observe the passing of 
 bulldozers. This on­the­ly approach, moreover, is of course 
totally unsuitable for the implementation of a complex rural 
road program or a decentralized irrigation program, actions 
which require thousands of detailed technical studies and 
hundreds of thousands of hours of discussions with villagers. 
Only local institutions, initially supported by NGOs, can 
manage such operations. 
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12 A “manager” is needed to try to manage  
 ‘unruly’ donors 
As far as international aid is concerned, there has been no 
shortage of commitment or individual talent. There also has 
been no shortage of high­quality analytical studies to help 
with decisions, and it is therefore not because of a lack of 
information that the right decisions have not been made30! 
The lack of logic in this sectoral and geographic allocation of 
aid resources stems from a total lack of strategic manage­
ment. The problem is both institutional and political. It is 
clear that the needed oversight should be entrusted to a top 
leader in the Afghan government. But as a general rule, few 
governments in so­called “fragile countries” have the techni­
cal capacity not to mention the political authority needed to 
impose discipline and a coherent strategy on donors. In a 
country that has been as weakened as Afghanistan, this task 
was even more dificult since the governmental architecture 
(lack of a Prime Minister and weakness of the President’s 
services) was problematic. 
It is true that the irst Minister of Finance, Mr Ashraf 
Ghani, who was perfectly able to manage foreign aid in a 
coherent way, attempted to do so during his tenure. But he 
had no  formal mandate and he antagonized many in his 
 attempt to impose a minimum of order in this area. His de­
parture in 2004 left the management of the aid system adrift. 
It is also true that teams of consultants prepared so many 
strategy papers that it is easy to lose track. But these were 
formal  exercises intended for donors’ conferences (London 
in 2006, Paris in 2008, Kabul in 2010) and it is in this respect 
a pity to see that the bible in this area, the ‘Afghan National 
Development Strategy’, which was greatly inspired by the 
PRSP31 approach, contains some forty priorities and is a 
 catalog that essentially takes care to use the politically cor­
rect vocabulary expected by donors… Only for the 2010 
Kabul donor conference, the set of objectives was inally 
 reduced to a more manageable number of 10 priorities.
Under these conditions, aid institutions tend to behave like 
consumers in a supermarket. National strategy papers pro­
vide them with long lists of needs. Donors then choose the 
needs from this long list that best correspond to the wishes of 
their constituents and pressure groups. Their institutional 
 requirements, and not the country’s most pressing needs, de­
termine their action. As their MDG’s32 determined conceptual 
framework is still poverty reduction, they focus on the social 
sectors of education and health, forgetting by the way the 
 urgency of building rural roads, which nobody is interested 
in; the rehabilitation of agriculture and irrigation networks, 
both terribly complicated subjects; energy, a sector that has 
 30 See “Responding to Afghanistan’s Development Challenges”, 
 William Byrd, World Bank, 2007.
 31 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, prepared by governments of aid 
recipient countries to determine each country strategy to ight poverty 
and make the best use of aid resources. 
 32 Millennium Development Goals. These eight broad goals were 
adopted by the international community in September 2000 and 
 today largely determine the specific objectives of donors in aid 
 recipient countries. 
been ‘polluted’ in Afghanistan by the presence of a major 
warlord at its reins; not to mention the restructuring of the 
justice system, of the Ministry of Interior and the district and 
provincial administration, etc. These areas are indeed com­
plex. But they are only insurmountable if each donor tries to 
address them individually instead of collectively, without 
having the political courage to raise the issue of some minis­
ters and governor’s’ extraordinary incompetence or corrup­
tion. In the end, each donor does what it wants, and in the 
very words of an ambassador in Kabul, “international aid is 
as dificult to manage as a herd of cats!”
But aid also lost interest in some sectors when trade­offs 
had to be made. Indeed, out of the approximately $15 billion 
that were actually disbursed between 2002 and mid­2007, if 
we subtract the shameless margins of some companies that 
managed a large part of American aid, and technical assis­
tance spending, less than about $10 billion probably remained 
to meet the needs of a country the size of France, where abso­
lutely everything needed to be rebuilt. In fact, contrary to 
what might be thought, this is quite a small sum. It is in any 
case very small compared with the amounts that were spent 
on military operations during this period, the real ratio being 
closer to 1 to 13 than the 1 to 9 initially mentioned. Clearly 
another balance between military spending and civilian de­
velopment spending would have been warranted. 
13 The generous principles deined in  
 the Paris and Accra aid effectiveness  
 conferences are inoperative
Under these conditions, the well­known principles of the 
Paris 2005 and Accra 2008 conferences on aid effectiveness 
are largely inoperative and almost naive. In fragile countries, 
aid needs in fact to be able, if needed, to manage itself. But 
when aid mobilizes powerful players like the United States 
Department of Defense, USAID, NATO, the World Bank, 
and the Asian Development Bank, traditional coordination 
mechanisms are unable to deine and impose priorities that 
everyone will respect. There is no lead manager who can 
take charge. Although the United Nations may have the le­
gitimacy to do so, and UNDP always attempts to take the 
lead,  neither the UN nor its UNDP arm have the technical 
capacity and the political clout to do so. Finally the United 
States, which could have assumed this responsibility, was 
unavailable due to its mobilization in Iraq. 
On the whole, this drastic inability of international aid in 
Afghanistan to develop a mechanism allowing a clear strate­
gy to drive its overall action now means that radical reforms 
need to be undertaken for future interventions in other difi­
cult regions. There obviously needs to be a pilot and a clear 
strategy that all donors must follow. America’s irst ambas­
sador in Kabul of Afghan origin, Zalmay Khalilzad, who was 
perfectly aware that the country’s reconstruction required the 
establishment of strong State institutions, was certainly 
 capable of exercising this type of responsibility, on account 
of his authority and knowledge of the country. But the Bush 
administration sent him as ambassador to Baghdad when the 
security situation in Iraq collapsed in 2005, clearly showing 
where the US placed its priorities. In 2007, the British, deeply 
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worried by the disorder in Western aid efforts in Afghanistan, 
proposed that the former United Nations High Representative 
for Bosnia, Lord Ashdown, a former high ranking military 
oficer with a strong personality, coordinate all military and 
civilian aid to Afghanistan, thus providing the needed strate­
gic guidance. But President Karzai refused, seeing Lord 
Ashdown as a kind of colonial governor who was being 
 imposed on him. This issue is clearly sensitive. 
And yet it is obvious that managing huge aid lows in such 
countries requires a high­level coordinator with the requisite 
authority. Apparently, only a high representative of the 
United Nations Secretary­General can have the legitimacy to 
ensure such coordination. But for him to impose his autho­
rity, in addition to a strong personality, he would need do­
nors to reach a consensus about the principle of having a 
clear common overall strategy driving the global aid effort, 
which for the moment is not at all the case; he would also 
require a very solid technical team to assist him, a team that 
in all likelihood, only the World Bank could easily mobilize. 
The implementation of such a duopoly between the high 
 representative of the United Nations Secretary­General and 
a technical team from the World Bank seems unavoidable in 
this type of situation, as I suggested to the World Bank 
President, Mr. Robert Zoellick and his management team. I 
admit that I am confounded by the fact that such a solution 
has not been adopted in Afghanistan33. The high representa­
tive of the United Nations Secretary­General himself should 
report to the high representatives of the various countries 
involved in this support, drawing from the model introduced 
by the Obama administration. 
The simple presence of an aid coordinator enjoying exten­
sive power would certainly force the government to reorga­
nize itself to gradually take over control and strategic mana­
gement of aid resources that inances all public investment 
and most State current expenditures. Such coordination 
would require imposing priorities and discipline upon donors 
and would imply the allocation of most international aid to 
budget instruments like the ‘Afghan Reconstruction Trust 
Fund’, which was mentioned above. For project aid, it would 
be possible to rely on incentive tools, such as multilateral 
trust funds to top up the inancing of donors that effectively 
adhere to the set priorities34. 
14 The conceptual framework offered by the  
 MDGs and the standard PRSP approach  
 is not suited to the present context
This approach would also entail the preparation of a 
 common strategy shared by all donors and the deinition of 
joint  priorities together with local authorities. This type of 
approach would thereby force them to clearly specify their 
actual priorities, instead of contenting themselves with 
 33 Maybe today, no one wants to endorse the responsibility of the 
 coming failure…
 34 As such, a project that falls under one of the jointly deined pri­
orities and is inanced by aid could for instance see its inancing topped 
up by an allowance from the multilateral trust fund.
mixed­bag lists. In the current context, each donor individu­
ally prepares its own strategy in a conceptual framework 
that is still governed by the MDGs and the PRSP poverty 
reduction logic. However, in a country like Afghanistan, 
this laudable objective can only be the consequence of 
achieving a much more immediate goal, which is the re­
construction of a functioning government machinery. The 
ideology which, since the Millennium Development Goals, 
has treated aid as charity work, has particularly clouded 
the judgment of donors in Afghanistan, whereas an ap­
proach based on realpolitik – when faced with a failed State 
it is irst necessary to rebuild the machinery of government 
– would have been much more realistic. 
In 2007 in the DRC, the World Bank prepared, in conjunc­
tion with other funding agencies, and particularly the 
European Union and the United Nations institutions, a com­
mon assistance strategy to which almost all the country’s 
 donors gradually adhered. This exercise is therefore entirely 
possible and necessarily summons local authorities who need 
to organize themselves accordingly to respond. But in the 
DRC, the World Bank was solely able to act as honest broker 
between donors whose objectives were still determined by 
their own preferences and not by the country’s objective 
needs. In the end, this exercise, which was useful on account 
of the discussions it sparked among donors and between 
 donors and the government, did not result in real discipline 
capable of directing aid lows to sectors that had been 
 neglected by donors, particularly in the area of basic econo­
mic infrastructures such as roads. This inability from Western 
donors to extricate themselves from the MDG philosophy 
and their now favorite sectors, which are health and educa­
tion, gave Chinese business in the DRC an ideal opportunity 
to propose massive (and very expensive) road inancing that 
at one point almost jeopardized both the support and reform 
program that was then under negotiation with the IMF and 
the reaching of the HIPC completion point.
15 The creation of parallel administrations  
 by donors ends in disaster
We just saw that when common objectives and strategic aid 
management are lacking, aid is dispersed in areas and sectors 
that do not correspond to the most obvious priorities. Apart 
from the lack of strategic management of aid resources, 
 traditional intervention methods also contribute to aid inef­
fectiveness in very fragile countries. We know in fact that 
in these countries, the ineffectiveness of public policies and 
therefore of international aid stems from the dysfunction 
and corruption in local institutions. In failed states like 
Afghanistan in 2001, the problem was even more basic since 
not only had its institutions disappeared, but after years of 
war and civil strife, so had its qualiied personnel35. 
In a context where there is a severe shortage of qualiied 
personnel, donors, whether multilateral and bilateral agencies 
or NGOs, have therefore proceeded in Afghanistan as they 
usually do in this type of situation, i.e. they have established 
 35 The context is similar in Cambodia and DRC.
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what are called ‘Project Implementation Units’36. For each 
project that they fund, they recruited the few available Afghan 
technical personnel from exile in Pakistan or Iran. Lacking 
budget constraints, and faced with a shortage of such profes­
sionals, the salaries rapidly climbed and ended up following 
the United Nations salary structure (the UN, incidentally, has 
become one of the country’s leading employers). The scope 
of aid inancing was such that starting in 2003­2004, a de 
facto parallel administration inanced by donors was there­
fore established. This parallel administration, which numbers 
about 120,000 (the Afghans speak of the ‘second civil ser­
vice’), manages hundreds or even thousands of miscellaneous 
operations when NGOs’ projects are taken into  account. In 
Afghanistan, this system’s laws, which are visible in all 
 fragile countries, have become exceptional. The salary differ­
ences between the aid­funded project administration and the 
public administration that is simultaneously being built are at 
least 1 to 10 and can reach 1 to 40. Technical project mana­
gers who would earn $150 per month in the public adminis­
tration are commonly paid $800 to 6,000 by donors. 
This approach has considerable drawbacks. Not only is the 
State’s bureaucracy having a dificult time modernizing, but 
this system drains the public service of its residual human 
capacities as well as those it is trying to train. Indeed, as soon 
as technical personnel are trained, they lee to this parallel 
administration to beneit from its exceptional salaries. And 
yet the project implementation units are not long­term struc­
tures. They disappear with project completion and the end of 
corresponding foreign funding. This parallel administration 
is therefore in a constant cycle of capacity creation and 
 destruction. No lasting institutional capacity is built. For 
want of an alternative, aid coordination and the deinition of 
sectoral policies, which are the responsibilities of central 
 administrations, also have to be entrusted to donor­funded 
project implementation units. When we travel up the hierar­
chical chain we see that many high Afghan leaders, even at 
the ministerial level, also belong to such project implementa­
tion units to collect the corresponding salaries. The system is 
totally unstable and can only last as long as international aid 
agrees to pay.
16 Building modern institutions and ultimately a  
 modern government structure is a necessary  
 condition to establish lasting peace
In most central administrations, where there is a minimal 
 level of essential work to be done, the leaders do not have 
available Afghan technical personnel. Since foreign technical 
assistants are perceived as a free good, the easiest  approach is 
to use technical assistance to make up for the lack of compe­
tent local staff. Therefore, taking into account the high costs 
of international consulting irms and security fees, govern­
ment agencies and ministries commonly pay $30 to 40,000 per 
month to consulting irms providing  experts in charge of work 
that indeed cannot be done by  local staff paid $150, but would 
be advisable to entrust to Afghan professionals paid $500 to 
 36 PIUs, a term that is systematically used in donors’ technical documents.
800. These foreign  experts work in a country where they do 
not understand the languages and the culture, where they do 
not have local counterparts, where local managers cannot de­
ine or monitor properly their work, and where their loyalty to 
the Afghan authorities is uncertain since their  careers depend 
on the  international consulting irms that  employ them.
This technical assistance is presently posing a dual 
 problem: A inancial problem since its cost, which reaches 
now around $500 million per year37, represents about twice 
the cost of civil service salaries; and a political problem, 
since its overbearing presence is increasingly being resented. 
Furthermore, this technical assistance cannot train local pro­
fessionals to replace it since Afghan staff leave as soon as 
they are trained. The result then is an impasse, with criticism 
being made of the technical assistance whose quality is dete­
riorating as security conditions themselves are worsening. 
But nobody, including donors and high Afghan leaders, 
knows what else to do. This problem, which has become criti­
cal in Afghanistan, is not speciic to this country. In the DRC, 
government leaders are currently facing a similar problem as 
they attempt to form the technical teams that they urgently 
need. I was recently on a mission for the Cambodian govern­
ment, which was faced with the same type of challenge. It is 
astonishing that far from being new, these issues were already 
present in Africa in the 1980s and that appropriate solutions 
had already been devised in the early 90s38. 
One solution could entail trying to rapidly increase the 
public sector’s salaries. But the weakness of the tax ratio 
in a country that paradoxically has always lived off its 
geopoli tical income39 means that the necessary iscal 
 resources cannot be mobilized. In this respect, the govern­
ment depends on the good will of donors who nonetheless 
are reluctant to make long­term commitments, which are 
essential in this ield. A hasty salary increase would also 
feed signiicant  inlation which is already being provoked 
by the injection of large amounts of aid, already fueling a 
standard ‘Dutch  disease’ syndrome. Furthermore, while 
salary increases are essential to attract and retain valuable 
professionals, they are far from being suficient to ensure 
this administration’s quality. 
In addition to acceptable wage conditions, in order to build 
an effective government structure, at least ive other condi­
tions indeed need to be met: 1) recruitment of leaders must 
occur on a merit basis, 2) promotions must not be separated 
from performance, 3) the organization of State institutions 
must follow basic rules of functionality, 4) work must be 
 governed by clear rules and procedures, and 5) the personali­
ties at the head of these administrations must demonstrate 
qualities of leadership, organization and integrity. It is there­
fore necessary to undertake a comprehensive reform of the 
 37 Review of Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in 
 Afghanistan, discussion paper for the Afghan Development Forum”, 
Serge Michailof, World Bank, April 2007.
 38 “Rethinking technical Cooperation, Reforms for Capacity Buiding” 
Elliott Berg coordinator, UNDP, 1993.
 39 Paid by the British in the 19th century, the Soviets and Americans 
from 1945 to the 1970s, then only by the Soviets until 1990, by Pakistan 
in the Taliban period and by the US and international aid since 2002.
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public administration in order to rebuild the government 
structure. This task is extremely ambitious and dificult since 
it needs to be implemented rapidly and on a large scale. It is 
also politically challenging. 
17 Lack of donor interest and political logic  
 combine to avoid addressing these issues
The construction of modern government institutions in 
Afghanistan as in all fragile countries is therefore essential. 
Leaving the responsibility of hundreds of projects to interna­
tional donors or to PRTs cannot be a reconstruction policy. 
Neither is subcontracting the development of rural areas to 
NGOs that are not supervised by coherent national programs. 
The importance of reconstructing the government structure 
was initially recognized both by Afghan authorities and some 
funding agencies. We already noticed that Mr. Ashraf Ghani, 
who was Finance Minster in the early 2000s, led a complete 
reorganization of the Ministry of Finance and the Central 
Bank thanks to signiicant USAID funding. To do so, he 
 recruited teams of Afghan professionals on consulting 
 contracts who were supervised mostly by US technical as­
sistants. He was successful in restructuring, customs, taxes 
and the treasury; he secured the payment chain of govern­
ment expenses, entrusted government procurement responsi­
bilities to a foreign entity, blocked corruption at this level, 
started using the budget as an economic policy instrument, 
and implemented a monetary policy worthy of the name. 
Dismissed in 2004  because he was becoming an obstacle to 
several powerful players, his actions to build an institution 
nevertheless weathered the course of time. The system re­
mains fragile, as the status of the Afghan consultants that 
make up the ministry’s backbone remains uncertain and the 
qualities of his successors may vary. If, however, Afghanistan 
had been able to both beneit from two dozen ministers of 
this caliber as early as 2002 and mobilize the billion dollars 
 needed from donors over a 3 to 4 year period to rebuild the 
main State institutions, aid would have been used ininitely 
more effectively. The country would have had a serious 
 government structure by 2005/2006 and would not be in the 
 dramatic situation it is in now.
In addition to the headache caused by the existence of 
two parallel administrations with incompatible wage struc­
tures, the oficial government administration and the 
 project  implementation units inanced by donors, the ive 
aforementioned conditions are met only in the few modern 
institutions that I have already mentioned and have been 
created since 2003: the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation 
which was a showcase example, the National Army (ANA), 
the National Directorate of Security, the Ministry of 
Finance, the Central Bank and gradually the Education and 
Health Ministries. The Afghan drama is that the other key 
institutions critical for stabilizing the country, particularly 
the police, justice system and local government, have 
 remained traditional  administrations of a failed state 
 governed by nepotism and corruption. 
There are three main reasons for this dismal situation: 
1) The lack of donor interest in institution development for 
want of a coherent strategy in spite of the availability of 
high­quality analytical studies40. 2) The resistance of tra­
ditional power structures, taking into account that in 
Afghanistan, like in most fragile States, institutions are 
 distributed to political “friends” as booty in order to consoli­
date the political alliance process. 3) The political alliances 
encouraged by the Bush administration on which President 
Karzai’s power is based.
Under this logic, political­ethnic networks are naturally 
formed within each institution, and membership in these 
 networks, and not merit, determines recruitment and promo­
tion. This logic is very strong and contradicts any goal of 
effectiveness. Ultimately, in most cases, ministers with 
sometimes only very basic training blindly manage institu­
tions whose missions are vague, whose organization is de­
fective, whose internal procedures are nonexistent, and 
whose supervisory personnel are chosen based on ethnical 
and political criteria. This system’s obvious laws increase 
the distrust of donors that are terrorized by corruption risks. 
They conirm their belief that only the project implementa­
tion units that they select, and whose personnel they pay, can 
implement the projects and programs they fund. The circle is 
now complete.
What is remarkable is that in spite of these gigantic hin­
drances, some Afghan institutions have successfully orga­
nized themselves, recruited a nucleus of valuable profession­
al staff, implemented policies that are gradually becoming 
coherent, and managed relatively effective action programs. 
To so do, they were assisted by various aid programs to build 
the capacities of Afghan administrations. Unfortunately, 
these programs were established in a way that was too limited 
and with too few resources. 
Given the political conditions at the time, at least until the 
2004 presidential election, it was undoubtedly necessary to 
appoint a number of men with dubious track records at the 
head of certain ministries, for this was where they could do 
the least harm. The number of men with the authority and 
experience to oversee an ambitious modernization process 
was also certainly limited. But at least donors should have 
deined a clear strategy in this area, proposed it to President 
Karzai, released the billion dollars required to rebuild the 
government structure and offered the Afghan authorities a 
clear deal on the following basis: “ind men and women with 
the necessary leadership qualities and we will give you the 
dollars you need to rebuild your institutions”. This deal was 
not offered. Instead, a program with an insuficient reach and 
a fragile design was implemented, the Priority Reform and 
Restructuring Program (PRR). 
18 This reconstruction of State institutions is  
 possible even in very dificult environments
This approach was developed on the basis of the Independent 
Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission 
 40 The corresponding study is comprehensive and remarkable. It 
 corresponds to the equivalent of several years of expert work: 
“ Afghanistan, Building an Effective State, Priorities for Public 
 Administration reform”, World Bank 2008.
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(IARCSC), which was created under the Bonn Agreement 
in 2001. The goal of this institution is precisely to facilitate 
the creation of a modern administration by selecting civil 
servants on the basis of merit only. This institution, which 
was established with the help of several donors, focused its 
efforts, for want of resources, on a limited number of key 
departments in the ministries deemed the most important. 
On this occasion, it introduced bonuses in order to offer 
incentive salaries based on the job market’s conditions. The 
approach was intended to be temporary, pending a new sal­
ary scale whose budget cost obviously presented a serious 
iscal problem. 
But this initial approach rapidly became blocked by mul­
tiple factors: Unequal salaries in the same institution 
 between “PRR” and “non­PRR departments’ weakened 
motivation in non­beneiciary departments and created 
 unmanageable tension. Technical and inancial support 
from funding agencies remained too feeble41. Merit­based 
selection directly clashed with traditional practices based 
on the distribution of jobs to ‘friends’. Numerous ministers 
viewed it as a fundamental hindrance to their power. In the 
irst few years, the IARCSC selection committee made a 
number of blunders and selection errors. And last but not 
least, apart from a small pilot project, the program was not 
extended to the local  government which should have been 
its main beneiciary. 
In the face of mounting criticism, the government chose to 
forge ahead in 2005, extending the PRR to all the country’s 
ministries and departments. But not surprisingly, the lack of 
resources blocked the experiment which now only concerns 
about 31,000 staff out of a total of 350,000 civil servants. 
Note, to avoid ambiguity, that the cost of salary surpluses for 
an ambitious reform program would have  represented only a 
fraction of the annual cost of technical assistance. 
The approach then focused on a general revision of the 
civil service’s salary scale and a reclassiication of person­
nel thanks to a ‘Pay and Grading’ program which again ran 
into resource constraints. This program now beneits about 
16,000 staff. Since then, other speciic ad hoc schemes 
funded by different donors have proliferated and provide 
bonuses and top ups to civil servants and fund local consul­
tants in what has now become a completely chaotic system. 
I have identiied at least 9 different schemes providing such 
bonuses which may reach up to $12,000 per month for 
 presidential appointees. 
Altogether an unspeciied number of civil servants and 
 local consultants beneit from such schemes lavishly paid 
by different donors. Since there is no coherence in the 
 system because the different schemes are funded by differ­
ent donors in an uncoordinated way, the wide differences 
in treatment now fuel resentment and jealousy among 
 41 From 2003 until 2006 for all of the approximately 30 ministries and 
concerned institutions combined, capacity building and related institu­
tion building technical assistance contributions accounted for less than 
one­third of what USAID had given to the Ministry of Finance alone. It 
was not until 2007 that a group of donors inally organised signiicant 
inancial relief to support this process. Too late once again…
beneiciaries. Note that this approach does not settle the 
problem of the government’s overall effectiveness unless 
the other 5 points listed above are addressed. The key prob­
lem that should have been raised initially is the dual lack of 
Afghan leadership and  strategic oversight of international 
aid, which never devoted the required attention and money 
to this major topic. 
Conversely, the MRDD sets a good example of what 
should be done. First it is necessary to systematically deine 
the  institution’s missions and objectives, carefully select a 
small team of high­quality senior professionals, and offer 
them compensation that corresponds to the job market. 
Develop the institution on this basis, by recruiting properly 
paid, high­quality personnel at each level. Deine the organi­
zation, responsibilities, procedures, and working methods. 
Then mobilize  inancing, insofar as possible, in the form of 
national programs, where donor money melts into a common 
pot managed by the ministry. Prepare projects that are then, 
in the framework of these national programs, widely imple­
mented in the ield by closely supervised NGOs. And 
 lastly, discipline international aid so that it complies with 
the basic principles of the Paris and Accra conferences on 
aid harmonization. 
The Afghan leaders and the international community had 
and still have an administrative reconstruction model that 
works42 right before their eyes. But there was lacking, and 
there still is lacking, will and real leadership on the part of the 
Afghans’ highest authorities. First is needed a political deci­
sion to exit opportunistic alliances with ‘power brokers’, 
‘strong­men’, former warlords, clan leaders, drug trafickers 
and maiosi, in order to build a modern State43. On the basis 
of such a political choice that can scarcely be imposed from 
the outside, all that would have been needed was about a 
 hundred capable leaders with free hands who, in key posts, 
would have made a difference and cleared inevitable block­
ages and obstacles. 
Indeed, under the stress of war, some leaders of this type 
are now being appointed to important posts. Now is the last 
time to conirm this experiment which still remains too lim­
ited. There is also lacking, from donors who have also now 
largely lost their faith, a real will to depart from business as 
usual, to leave aside the habitual concern for party loyalty 
and accept a discipline where aid can be managed according 
to clear strategic objectives. A main leader on this end will 
therefore be needed to provide the missing coherence. In the 
present mess, I tend to believe that only the US can provide 
such leadership as they de facto do in the military area. In 
addition, more money will certainly be required. But even 
more importantly, time is required to make up for all the 
 42 Or rather, unfortunately, that “worked”, for recent management 
changes seem to have seriously weakened this institution, but this does 
not challenge the method.
 43 On this subject, see the ierce assertion by one of America’s best 
experts on Afghanistan on the need to put an end to the power and impu­
nity of these ‘Power Brokers’: “Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition 
from Turmoil to Normalcy”, Barnett R. Rubin. Council on Foreign Re­
lations. March 2006.
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time that has been lost44… Basically, from 2002 to 2005, 
Afghanistan could have made the choice to modernize its 
State. The Karzai regime and its Western backers ended up 
refusing this modernization. This unfortunate choice having 
been made, the country was returned to its demons. 
19 The sustainable construction of democracy  
 requires a bottom-up approach 
I would now like to address a subject that is outside my direct 
area of expertise and that goes far beyond the Afghan frame­
work, but that cannot be kept silent – and that is the demo­
cratic model that the international community is currently 
and systematically imposing on these post­conlict countries. 
I have already expressed my skepticism45 with regards to the 
‘appeasing’ character of a top­down democratic process that 
is limited to presidential and legislative elections imposed by 
the international community upon unprepared social struc­
tures. In fact, while this approach undoubtedly puts an end to 
a political impasse with the irst election, there is a strong risk 
that things will go wrong in the next elections, 5 or 6 years 
later, when the team in power that now controls the revenues 
and rents associated with its position inevitably refuses to 
surrender its place. The disastrous presidential election at 
the end of 2009 in Afghanistan, like the legislative elections 
in 2010, highlighted this type of problem, which also created 
a dangerous split in the political alliance that was agreed 
to in 2001 between the former Northern Alliance and some 
Pashtun groups. As noted by a well­known expert on 
Afghanistan, “The political process is corrupt. The only way 
to obtain a seat at the table now is not to try to get elected 
but to take up arms”46. 
These issues are generally misunderstood by the interna­
tional community, which naively believes that democracy 
automatically tones down political disputes and persists in 
imposing such democratic structures in accordance with a 
top­down approach with time frames that are much too 
tight47. The organization of the 2005 legislative elections in 
Afghanistan was severely defective; in fact, contrary to its 
mandate and the 2001 Bonn Agreement, the electoral com­
mission systematically validated the candidacies of powerful 
“commanders” of armed militias, including those of former 
war criminals. The Afghan parliament, which undeniably has 
some remarkable personalities, including women with excep­
tional courage and talent, is therefore partly comprised of 
 maiosi and gang leaders who bought their votes and conse­
quently immunity, which they hurried to reinforce by enact­
ing an amnesty law. Here we have a caricature of a parliament 
that will heavily inluence the country’s fate.
 44 On this subject, see: “Sortir du Piège Afghan”, Serge Michailof, 
Commentaire No 126, Summer 2009.
 45 See “Notre maison Brûle au Sud”, cited above.
 46 “Afghanistan’s 2009 elections” William Maley (Asia Paciic 
 College of Diplomacy), Afghanistan info No 65, October 2009. 
 47 Ariane Quentier, in her book that was cited above (Afghanistan, Au 
Coeur du Chaos), points out that the Afghan election was above all a 
domestic American political issue “organised for the Americans” as not­
ed by Younus Quanouni, one of President Karzai’s historical opponents. 
There is, of course, no miracle solution in this area; but it 
seems that in such circumstances more time should be spent 
under a provisional UN or other administrative mechanism 
before rushing to national elections. The goal should be to 
facilitate the search for political compromise in order to 
 establish monitoring mechanisms and checks and balances, 
so as to keep the election winner from hoarding excessive 
power and revenues. The ‘winner takes all’ system which 
 becomes the norm in such countries is a recipe for a bleak 
future as demonstrated by recent events in the Ivory Coast. It 
is especially important to take time to create a grassroots 
 democracy at the village level. This is where democracy is 
most urgently felt and demanded by populations. Villagers in 
most ‘failed’ States suffer either from the lack of a State, the 
State’s atrocities, or the atrocities of local ‘strong­men’. The 
thirst for grassroots democracy is therefore immense. 
20 The famous ‘compact’ between the  
 international donor community and  
 the Karzai regime should have been  
 much simpler and much tougher 
A constitutional reform is undoubtedly necessary in 
Afghanistan, in order to establish monitoring and power­
sharing mechanisms. But at the same time, it will undeniably 
be essential to construct, if it is still possible, a real grassroots 
democracy, probably starting with Community Development 
Councils or similar structures, and by giving real substance to 
the various provincial bodies that have been created on paper 
but currently have no resources or authority. This is an ambi­
tious project that should move this centralized Afghan State, 
which exists on paper only, to a more decentralized form. 
This approach, which aims to construct a grassroots democ­
racy according to a bottom­up process, incidentally corre­
sponds to the vision of Hanif Atmar, who was ‘blocked’ by 
President Karzai when he tried to pitch this idea. Contrary to 
common opinion, this type of approach can be implemented 
fairly rapidly in tandem with a local development program 
like the ‘National Solidarity Program’. But once again, is it 
too late in Afghanistan? That is, unfortunately probably the 
case in the southern and eastern parts of the country. The year 
2011 will tell us whether it is also too late for the rest of 
the country.
It is clear that the Afghan authorities and the international 
community now have their backs to the wall. When I ques­
tioned my driver in Kabul in 2008, a former civil servant who 
had quit his government job that did not even allow him to 
pay his rent, he made the following frightful comment: “out 
there, in the countryside, it’s better with the Taliban who are 
honest at least; and in the city, it was better with the 
Communists who were less corrupt”. 
It is easy to see that under these conditions, sending tens of 
thousands of additional soldiers, which is what President 
Obama recently did, or mobilizing a few billion additional 
dollars in aid, which are partly ictive or largely wasted, 
makes little sense and is likely to end in failure. Dificult 
 decisions now need to be made. The real compact between 
the international community and President Karzai should 
have been ininitely more stringent than the one that was 
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 presented in the London and Paris conferences. This ‘com­
pact’ should have been summarized in 2 paragraphs: 
 Aid shall irst and urgently address the reconstruction 
of the Afghan government structure. For this to happen, 
about a hundred Afghan leaders with the requisite 
qualities of integrity, leadership and organization shall 
be appointed to head key institutions and positions. The 
regime’s current alliance with despised warlords 
 involved in drug traficking shall be re-examined.
 The international community shall contribute a few 
 billion dollars in additional aid. But aid should be 
paired with a clear strategy for its use under the 
 authority of a powerful ‘aid manager’ able to impose 
discipline to donors. 
The terms of this ‘compact’ would certainly have been 
deemed too restrictive by the Karzai regime. But if dificult 
decisions cannot be made, where are we headed? Perhaps it 
is best to limit our losses, leave a failed State with its failure 
and try to rapidly negotiate an honorable exit strategy with 
the Pakistani ISI and the Taliban, to at least keep Ben Laden 
from noisily settling back in Kandahar… 
21 The international community’s approaches  
 in these countries need to be reassessed
This rather harsh assessment of what must be called the 
 failure of international aid in Afghanistan is offering as coun­
terpoint not a model, which would be valid in all places and 
at all times, but the major principles that international aid 
should obey to tackle the new challenges posed by fragile 
post conlict countries’ reconstruction needs. 
21.1 More resources are needed and not just  
promises or media gestures, and they are 
needed urgently
In this area, the ten or so billion dollars that were actually 
disbursed in Afghanistan from 2002 to the start of 2007 for 
development assistance proved to be highly insuficient. It is 
clear that the ratio between military spending and civilian 
spending should have been more evenly balanced. We also 
noted the importance of this aid’s quality so that it does not 
become lost in cascading subcontractor margins. Large sums 
need to be available rapidly. This poses thorny problems to 
countries heavily in arrears with major funding agencies. 
Such large sums should also be made available over the long 
term, which contradicts the traditional principles of perfor­
mance­based aid, under which the exceptional amounts 
 mobilized for post­conlict countries are rapidly reduced after 
a few years.
21.2 The objectives that the international community 
will set need to be perfectly clear
In this respect, the charitable objectives that arose from the 
MDGs which serve as the conceptual framework for devel­
opment agencies’ actions are unsuited to this type of 
situation. It seems clear that objectives to rapidly restore 
personal safety and improve local governance should be­
come top  priorities. International forces cannot sustainably 
meet this type of need. In fact, the reconstruction (or ex 
nihilo construction) of the State machinery of government 
is fundamental and this objective should mobilize a large 
part of the international community’s efforts. The army, 
the  police, the local government and administration, the 
local justice system, the Ministry of Finance and other i­
nancial institutions should be straightened out as a priority. 
Other state institutions, particularly those that will facili­
tate the revival of the economy (public works, energy, ag­
riculture, and irrigation) should also follow as quickly as 
possible. In short, the comprehensive reconstruction of the 
government machinery and the public  administration 
 reform should be high priorities. Such institutional re­
construction requires sustained long­term efforts and some-
times long term  funding of these institutions’ operating 
costs by the  international community. 
21.3 International action needs to be coordinated 
much more seriously
In this respect, the major principles, which are certainly 
 laudable, for aid coordination that were deined in the 2005 
and 2008 Paris and Accra conferences on aid effectiveness, 
are mostly inoperative and even quite naïve in such environ­
ments. The issue of who manages and who can manage aid 
should be clariied. I had the occasion here to make a few 
concrete proposals that for the moment have been rejected 
by the main aid agencies and that, to be implemented, would 
require a top­level political decision. This is a subject that 
should now be examined by the G20. Aid resources must 
 indeed be managed with a strategic vision. We know that 
fragile or failed states cannot perform such strategic man­
agement, at least during the initial period. The question of 
who can perform this strategic management of aid resources 
is still unresolved. This question triggers emotional re­
sponses. Experience shows that major donors are also un­
able to seriously coordinate their strategies and actions be­
yond main policy statements and that conversely, they 
engage in power and precedence struggles. The United 
Nations institutions that would have the legitimacy to coor­
dinate aid do not have the capacity to do so. The imposition 
of United Nations ‘mandates’ is no longer a politically ac­
ceptable option, nor is the use of expatriate quasi­governors. 
There is obviously no easy answer to this question which is 
nonetheless central to aid effectiveness in these situations. 
My suggestion is to start by having major donors prepare 
joint country assistance  strategies and to do so fairly rapidly 
(the irst year in which aid interventions resume). In any 
case, it is important to build local aid management capaci­
ties which may entail modi ications to the government 
 architecture, capacity­building  requiring salary innovations, 
and local political will. Respect of discipline, which is es­
sential for such strategic coordination of aid, also requires 
the use of multi­donor trust funds and the development of 
speciic tools such as matching funds inanced by major 
funding agencies.
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21.4 The aid strategy should ensure a balance 
between urgent operations likely to rapidly 
deliver visible results (the famous peace  
dividends) and medium- to long-term actions 
whose purpose should be to construct  
modern, viable institutions in key sectors
In this area, there is a fundamental contradiction between 
 traditional project approaches whose short­term effectiveness 
relies on project teams (the famous PIUs) who are paid high 
salaries, and the need to build lasting institutions on salary 
bases that can be borne by local public inances. This argues 
in favor of a rapid launch of comprehensive civil service 
 reforms dealing with recruitment procedures, wage struc­
tures, human resource management methods, and the rules 
for  selecting able leaders. Such reforms should also cover the 
extent of state responsibilities and the possibilities of devel­
oping service delegations in some key sectors such as educa­
tion and health, public works and local development, where 
NGOs and some private companies can play an important 
role. But these reforms – let us not fool ourselves – are tech­
nically dificult, and require the mobilization of resources 
over long periods, which makes donors reluctant. They are 
also likely to collide with nepotism and with the logic 
 governing the political distribution of spoils of power which 
is so common in post­conlict situations.
21.5 Technical assistance in this type of situation 
should also be strategically managed
Technical assistance should no longer be randomly and 
 sporadically peppered around to meet emergencies. It 
amounts to huge inancial sums, i.e. around 30% of ODA in 
some circumstances. As Elliot Berg pointed out nearly 
twenty years ago48, it will not be truly effective unless it is 
part of coherent institutional construction strategies.
21.6 The support given by the international  
community to the reconstruction of the  
machinery of government raises the issue  
of the supported regime’s legitimacy and the 
limits of democracy in this type of context
While general elections under the supervision of international 
observers are part of the standard compact with the interna­
tional community and undoubtedly a necessary irst step, 
their limits are also now obvious. In a recent publication49, 
Paul Collier thoroughly describes the caricature of democra­
cies that are commonly being established in fragile post­ 
conlict countries. Paul Collier reminds us that a democracy 
that (i) is limited to periodic elections, (ii) does not allow any 
change in government, (iii) allows the winner to carry off all 
of the political and economic power, and (iv) whose logic is 
largely ethnic, ultimately leads to a rise in political tension 
 48 “Rethinking technical Cooperation”, Elliot Berg, UNDP 1993.
 49 “War Guns and Votes, Democracy in Dangerous Places”, Paul 
 Collier, Harper Collins 2009.
and not a resolution of conlict. In some cases where it is 
 obvious that the team in power will use all the devices at its 
disposal, which are numerous, to stay in power whatever the 
cost50, the appropriateness of some elections can be called 
into question. If we take the case of the DRC, if for example 
Bemba were to be cleared by the international criminal court 
and allowed to run for the next presidential election, simple 
ethnic arithmetic and the powerful means that are at the 
 disposal of the current power suggest that Bemba’s only 
chance of rising to power would be by fueling turmoil during 
the election period. Does all of this justify that the interna­
tional community should spend nearly $1 billion to organize 
elections whose sole result will be to aggravate tension that 
is already intense at the local level? But that being said, what 
is the alternative? 
21.7 The challenge of reconstructing state  
institutions is considerable for technical  
but especially political reasons
We already noticed that the required approach conlicts both 
with nepotism and the associated policies based on the 
 distribution of the booty which these institutions potentially 
represent. In order to rebuild or build modern institutions, 
it is  necessary to select leaders who have the leadership, 
 integrity and organizational qualities required for this task. 
The latter, who can always be found provided that there is 
real will, need to be able to recruit their management teams 
on the basis of merit and be able to compensate them 
 according to local job market conditions and not obsolete 
salary scales. This  approach’s success, as we saw above, 
 requires the inancial, technical and political support of in­
ternational aid, which needs to take care not to thwart it 
with short­term  approaches. This clearly comes up against 
the obvious  contradiction between concerns of effective­
ness in state  institutions, and the very strong logic of the 
redistribution of spoils of power between political partners 
that is speciic to most post­conlict contexts. Such being the 
case, this contradiction needs to be tackled by development 
partners head on. 
All in all, these principles of common sense, which relect 
the experience that I have acquired over time in many  dificult 
contexts, still conlict with the current practices of aid, which 
is still too ideologically marked by a purely charity­oriented 
approach and whose traditional poverty reduction objective 
is unsuited to these situations. All the same, ‘failed’ States are 
going to multiply. As shown in my recent book, they repre­
sent regional public challenges, and some could become 
global public challenges. While international aid is inally 
one of the very few available ‘instruments’ in the Western 
tool kit that could facilitate the reconstruction of failed states, 
it still needs to clearly deine this type of objective and better 
organize itself to do so. The culture shock that it will face to 
adapt to this task must not be underestimated. But the Afghan 
disaster clearly shows that ‘Business as usual’ in this area 
inevitably ends in failure. 
 50See Cote D’Ivoire!
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22 What lessons can be learned from  
 this analysis by international solidarity  
 organizations and NGOs?
Be clearheaded and realistic: NGOs need to understand that 
in such situations, the simple traditional compassionate 
 approach to aid leads to an impasse and that the immediate 
objective in a failed State consists in building or rebuilding 
a relatively modern State and its governing institutions. In 
this context, it is important not to do anything that will 
 hinder the achievement of this objective. 
Do not multiply actions that are not coordinated or inte-
grated into coherent sectoral strategies either with the local 
government or with major funding agencies. This type of 
 uncoordinated charity action undoubtedly brings occasional 
relief to abominable misery. But it also fuels the general 
 disorder and  contributes to the construction of a parallel ad­
ministration, thus undermining attempts to rebuild a modern 
administration. There are presently more than 300 health 
projects in DRC, out of which 90% cost less than $1 million. 
Is this  making much sense? The attitude that consists in 
 preparing and managing one’s ‘own’ projects and implement­
ing them with one’s ‘own’ personnel paid and selected ac­
cording to one’s ‘own criteria’ without referring to anyone, 
because the local government is considered incompetent and 
corrupt and major funding agencies are also viewed as in­
competent, ends up multiplying enclave operations whose 
sustainability is in any case highly dubious and whose ulti­
mate impact will be negligible. The government and funding 
agencies are perhaps incompetent but it will be necessary to 
‘make do’ and try to improve their performance rather than 
trying to bypass them. 
Indeed, it seems important for international NGOs to 
 actively engage major international donor agencies to allow 
them to beneit from the ield experience of NGOs. To do so, 
NGOs need to do what they are not used to doing, which is 
to participate in the development of major donor country and 
sector assistance strategies. Their objective should be to 
 clarify their own positioning and their future role. They 
should particularly insist on policies relying on delegation of 
responsibilities. Such delegation of responsibilities should 
aim to limit the implementing role of purely state institutions 
whose capacities in fragile states will clearly remain limited 
for a long period. It is, for instance, unrealistic to expect a 
failed State to eficiently operate a decentralized public 
health system in a rural environment. Specialized NGOs can 
do a much better job, provided their action can take place in 
the context of coherent health strategies and not add to the 
 current anarchy.
NGOs should also argue for greater coordination among 
funding agencies at global and sectoral levels and not hesi­
tate to publicize blatant coordination failures of donors to the 
international public. They might think it is impossible to 
make themselves heard by major donors who have an easy 
tendency to autism. I do believe that a solid critical article 
in the ‘Financial Times’ opens many doors in Washington, 
London and even Paris. 
It is also important for them to deliberately seek to support 
the governance and local government institutions that are 
under construction and take care not to replace them as is 
often the case.
Finally in degraded security contexts NGOs need to avoid 
letting their international and local personnel take  foolhardy 
risks. On several occasions, I have been appalled by the 
 completely thoughtless risks taken by NGO personnel in 
Afghanistan, which I imagine they took with their manage­
ment’s approval. Here NGO managers need to recruit techni­
cally experienced personnel with the requisite maturity and 
judgment to be able to work in this type of environment. That 
is not always the case. 
We know that the task is immense. Some conlicts have 
now lasted for a whole generation! But while the internation­
al community’s errors in Afghanistan since 2002 are alarm­
ing, the analysis of these errors also offers new ideas for 
 consideration and concrete solutions that are perfectly appli­
cable in other contexts. This is undoubtedly a meager conso­
lation, but it is important to at least learn from the many 
 mistakes that have been made in this unfortunate country. 
